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Many German philosophers and theologians are impressed by
Kant’s claim that arguments for the existence of God are im-
possible or by the idea that ‘modernity’ makes arguments for
the existence of God ‘problematic’. The title of this collection,
Proofs for the Existence of God as a Challenge to Modern Reason
reflects this. Though this collection starts from the idea that
proofs for the existence of God are ‘problematic’, it also chal-
lenges it.
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The collection is based on a conference in 2011 and presents 17
German articles (by Robert Spaemann, Rolf Schönberger, Jens
Halfwassen, Markus Gabriel, Thomas Buchheim, Axel Hutter,
Gunnar Hindrichs, Markus Enders, Friedrich Hermanni, Armin
Kreiner, Svend Andersen, Anton Friedrich Koch, Friederike Schick,
Christian Illies, Christoph Schwöbel, Friedo Ricken, and Mat-
thias Lutz-Bachmann) and three English articles (by Peter van
Inwagen, Richard Swinburne, and John Leslie) about arguments
for the existence of God.
Although, in my view, the term ‘analytic’ is often confusing,
it is informative to say that the German articles in this collec-
tion are in some sense non-analytic. Let my try to describe their
style. Some of the articles diﬀer from usual Anglo-American
philosophy articles just in that they address a rather broad ques-
tion or a range of questions and in that they interact much with
historical authors, in particular with Hegel, Kant, Leibniz, and
Thomas Aquinas. But they do defend a philosophical thesis or
at least comment on the authors they interact with. Other art-
icles defend no philosophical thesis but only present the view of
a historical author or compare several authors. But these latter
articles are not strictly exegetical either. They do not investigate
in detail how a particular text is to be interpreted. Rather, they
look for general characteristics of certain authors or for lines of
development of ideas. They paint a landscape of ideas or write
a drama in which they let historical authors interact with each
other. For these authors, this is one way of doing philosophy and
perhaps the only way they think philosophy is ‘possible today’.
They ‘reflect’ on authors or ideas, instead of, as Anglo-American
philosophers would do it, straight away defending a philosophical
thesis.
About half of the German articles in this collection are purely
or primarily historical in this way. For example, Friedo Ricken
presents Kant’s moral argument for the existence of God, Friederike
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Schick describes Leibniz’s and Samuel Clarke’s cosmological argu-
ments, and Rolf Schönberger presents a text by Meister Eckhart.
Jens Halfwassen reflects on the ontological argument, with refer-
ences to Hegel, Meister Eckhart and Plato. One of his questions
is: ‘If the absolute is conceived of as existing, is it then still con-
ceived of as the absolute? And if we conceive of the absolute,
following Meister Eckhart, as being itself or, following Hegel, as
the absolute idea and the absolute spirit, are we then still con-
ceiving of the absolute?’ Markus Gabriel, in his German article
‘Is the concept of God of the ontological argument consistent?’,
brings Anselm, Leibniz, and Hegel into dialogue with each other.
Let me turn to some of the articles with a more specific thesis.
Thomas Buchheim brings to our attention that often, especially
where Kant is admired, the term ‘proof of the existence of God’
(Gottesbeweis) is understood as implying that a proof removes
all doubt and stops all conjecturing. In German, that term is
being used more often than the term ‘argument for the existence
of God’, which does not imply this absolute certainty. In my
view, the very high standard of ‘proof’, which requires that it is
shown ‘once and for all’ that there is a God, is one of the main
reasons for the widespread scepticism towards arguments for the
existence of God. Buchheim gives four reasons for doubting the
possibility of proving God’s existence in this sense: 1. There is
no suﬃciently clear concept of God; 2. God is relevant for our
life; 3. we are not impartial; 4. it is supposed that the world is
independent and God is transcendent.
Also Armin Kreiner, who in his article raises objections against
cosmological arguments, has in mind deductive arguments which
produce absolute certainty. He just claims that the cosmological
argument is not cogent and leaves open whether there are suc-
cessful inductive, probabilistic cosmological arguments. One cri-
ticism I have about this collection is that the articles contained
pay too much attention to the idea of deductive arguments which
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make the existence of God absolutely certain. In my view, this
requirement was usually demanded only by opponents of theistic
arguments, and today, since Richard Swinburne’s The Existence
of God in 1979, such a notion of proof plays no role in the debate
about theism. Instead, the theistic and atheistic arguments put
forward today are almost without exception probabilistic, cumu-
lative, and inductive. Even those arguments that are presented
as deductive arguments, for example William Lane Craig’s kalam
cosmological argument, do not claim to be conclusive or to pro-
duce absolute certainty, but they are probabilistic in that they
cumulate as much evidence and support for the premises as they
can.
Friedrich Hermanni, in a particularly focussed and thoughtful
article, defends the cosmological as well as the ontological argu-
ment. Christian Illich argues carefully for the thesis that the the-
ory of evolution is compatible with theism. Richard Swinburne
puts forward detailed arguments against Hume’s and Kant’s ob-
jections against theistic arguments. John Leslie spells out and
defends a Platonic view of God according to which God is the
good and the good is creative. Peter van Inwagen distinguishes
three kinds of ontological arguments.
Fideistic positions, as they are rarely found in Anglo-American
philosophy, are expressed in the articles by Gunnar Hindrichs and
Christoph Schwöbel. Hindrichs thinks that there is something
obsessive about arguments for the existence of God: ‘Instead
of simply believing in God, some want their beliefs to be true.
For this, they show themselves and the others that God really
exists.’ (181) I would reply that, yes, I want my beliefs to be
true. Especially, I want the true belief about the existence of
God, because it is bad in itself to be wrong about the ultimate
cause, because I want to find the meaning of life, and because if
there is a God I want to worship him, evangelise, and do what he
wants me to do, while if there is no God, then there are better
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ways to spend my time.
Schwöbel’s article of 58 pages about the Christian belief in
creation starts from the thesis that Christian faith is not a hu-
man work and that therefore, although its content can be spelled
out rationally, it cannot be defended rationally. Instead of the
term ‘Christian doctrine of creation’ (Schöpfungslehre) Schwö-
bel uses the term ‘christlicher Schöpfungsglaube’ (492), which
means Christian belief or faith in creation. This is a matter of
faith, therefore it is not a human work, therefore no arguments
for it can be given. This pure fideism is illustrated also in Schwö-
bel’s five characteristics of ‘fundamentalism’, which, according to
Schwöbel, gave rise to ‘creationism’ (p. 489): 1. Fundamentalism
is a modern phenomenon, the doctrine of creationism has not
existed before in the history of Christianity. 2. Fundamentalists
take those claims to be fundamental which are most strongly cri-
ticised by the opponents. 3. Fundamentalists, and especially cre-
ationists, try to beat the enemies with their weapons when they
try to point out weaknesses and errors in the theory of evolution.
4. Fundamentalists transform the Christian faith into a world
view. ‘This becomes apparent most of all in that fundamental-
ism – like its opponent, i. e. scientism or atheistic evolutionism
– tries to win consent through arguments and proofs. [. . . ] [By
contrast,] according to the Christian view, faith is constituted by
the Holy Spirit making the truth of the gospel of Jesus Christ
evident to the person. Faith therefore is God’s work in us and is
created where and when it pleases God. For fundamentalism [by
contrast], faith consists in the acceptance of statements on the
basis of proofs and arguments.’ (490) 5. ‘Typical for fundament-
alism is an antagonistic dualism between followers and opponents
which does not allow for intermediate positions.’ (491) The inter-
mediate position which Schwöbel has in mind here seems to be
theistic evolution, which is probably his own position.
Regarding (1), I think that Schwöbel must understand ‘cre-
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ationism’ in a special way because obviously in general Christian
philosophers and theologians in the past believed that God cre-
ated some animals directly, i. e. he intervened in order to create,
and some believed that he did so in six days. But I did not find
such a definition in the article. Concerning (4), I would first
point out that besides Schwöbel’s view of faith and the view that
‘faith consists in the acceptance of statements on the basis of
proofs and arguments’, there is another alternative: Accepting
certain doctrines is a part of, and necessary for, faith, but in
addition faith involves certain actions and attitudes: repentance,
conversion, praying, asking God for forgiveness through Christ,
and commitment to God.
When Schwöbel says that someone’s belief that God created
the universe is produced by God directly but it is possible to
‘explicate’ the content of faith rationally (493), that could mean
that it is a matter of scientific and philosophical investigation how
God created, e. g. whether it involved interventions and which
ones. Schwöbel seems to confirm that when he says that integrat-
ing Darwin’s theory of evolution into ‘the Christian theology of
creation’ is an ‘explication of the faith in creation’ (496). But in
the fourth characteristic of fundamentalism, he criticises ‘funda-
mentalists’ for defending their view through arguments, instead
of just saying that the Holy Spirit makes the truth evident to
the person. In order to make his view coherent, Schwöbel should
give up his rejection of what he describes as characteristics of
fundamentalists in (3) and (4). Trying to point out weaknesses
and errors in the opponent’s theory and trying to win consent
through arguments and proofs is an essential mark of rational-
ity and science. However, it is honourable that Schwöbel, as a
endorser of theistic evolution, instead of suggesting that funda-
mentalists and creationists are dogmatic and do not use reason,
admits that creationists try to point out weaknesses in the the-
ory of evolution and try to win consent through arguments and
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proofs.
I conclude that this collection oﬀers research and reflections
about arguments for the existence of God from contemporary
German non-analytic philosophy and theology and that it con-
tains valuable research and insights. One criticism I have is
that the German articles hardly interact with the contemporary
Anglo-American philosophy of religion. Although one could reply
that also Anglo-American authors do not interact with these Ger-
man authors, I think that given the amount and the quality of
research on arguments for the existence of God that was pro-
duced in Anglo-American philosophy during the last forty years,
more interaction would be have been desirable. I hope that the
trend in German philosophy and theology to question the old pre-
judices about arguments for the existence of God will continue to
grow and that German philosophers and theologians will produce
many strong arguments for or against the existence of God.
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